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LETTER DATED 28 JULY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Unified Command established pursuant to Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, I have the honour to submit a report of the United Nations Command concerning the status of the Korean Armistice mechanism and the activities of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (see annex). It updates the last report submitted to the Security Council on 13 May 1996 (S/1996/351 and Corr.1, annex).

I request that the present letter, together with the enclosed report of the United Nations Command, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bill RICHARDSON

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Annex

Report of the activities of the United Nations Command for 1996

I. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND ITS MISSION

1. Security Council resolution 82 (1950) of 25 June 1950 determined that the armed attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) by forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) constituted a breach of the peace and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It also called upon the authorities of the DPRK to recall forthwith their armed forces to North Korea. In its resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950, the Security Council, having noted that the authorities of the DPRK had neither ceased hostilities nor recalled their armed forces north of the 38th parallel, recommended that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the ROK as would be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations authorize the Security Council to take such action as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, including the conduct of military operations by air, sea or land forces of the Member States. Based on this authority, in its resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, the Security Council recommended that all Member States make military forces and other assistance available to a unified command; requested the United States to designate a commander for the unified command; and directed the unified command to provide it with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the unified command.

(a) While looking at events within the constraints of an annual period does impose some artificiality, the present report provides a synopsis of the events of 1996 and attempts to convey objectively the impact of those events on the efforts of the United Nations Command (UNC) in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement;

(b) The authority granted the UNC by the Security Council also included the authority to negotiate a military armistice to end the fighting on a basis consistent with United Nations objectives and principles. The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), signed the Korean Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953 on behalf of all the forces of the 16 participating member States of the United Nations and those of the ROK, which had also fought under the flag of the United Nations. That Armistice Agreement, a military agreement between the opposing military commanders without a fixed expiration date, was intended to stop the Korean conflict and to ensure a complete cessation of hostilities. It created a 4-kilometre-wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which ran 151 miles across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula between the combatants. The DMZ, in turn, was further divided 2 kilometres in from each side by a Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Either side was permitted access to its 2-kilometre portion of the DMZ but was expressly prohibited from crossing the MDL;

(c) The Armistice Agreement was intended to make possible a final peaceful settlement and assumes that this end will, in good faith, be pursued. In its resolution 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954, the General Assembly noted paragraph 62

of the Armistice Agreement, which provides that the Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly supersede either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions, or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides. The Assembly also reaffirmed that the objectives of the United Nations remained the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Armistice Agreement, all CINCUNC successors in command are responsible for compliance with, and enforcement of, the terms and provisions of the Armistice Agreement;

(d) Today, the UNC continues to carry out its functions and to fulfil its obligations under the mandate of the Armistice Agreement and will continue that mission until a durable peace is achieved through political dialogue by the parties directly concerned with the Korean conflict. Of the original 16 Member States of the United Nations that provided military forces to the UNC during the Korean War, 9 nations are represented today. They are Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

II. ARMISTICE MECHANISM AND PROCEDURES

2. The Armistice Agreement is the only legal regime for maintaining the ceasefire between the opposing military forces in Korea and affects the actions of both sides in the conflict. It must be preserved until a more durable peace is achieved. The provisions of the Armistice Agreement are military in character and pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of all military forces under the unified command and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) signed the agreement on behalf of the communist forces. It is the responsibility of the opposing military commanders to enforce the ceasefire by all forces in Korea and to establish "measures and procedures" to ensure compliance. In that connection, the opposing military commanders must maintain effective communications in order to preclude possible incidents and to de-escalate the situation in the event incidents occur.

A. Military Armistice Commission

3. The Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was established by the Armistice Agreement to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of it. The MAC was created as a joint organization without a chairman, composed of 10 military Members: 5 senior officers from the UNC and 5 senior officers from the KPA/CPV. In accordance with paragraph 20 of the Armistice Agreement, CINCUNC appoints five senior officers, historically drawn from the ROK, the United States, the United Kingdom and other United Nations Member States still represented in the UNC. MAC meetings may be held at the request of either side in the Joint Security Area (JSA), more commonly known as Panmunjom, in the Korean DMZ. On 28 April 1994, however, the KPA MAC Secretary announced that the KPA would cease participation in all MAC activities.

(a) The Armistice Agreement of 1953 empowered each side to appoint a Secretary, an Assistant Secretary and other special assistants as required to perform functions in support of the MAC. Under the Armistice Agreement, UNC and KPA/CPV MAC Secretaries are authorized to conduct their own meetings as required, which normally serve as the basic channel of communication between both sides;

(b) The Joint Duty Office under the MAC Secretariat, located in the JSA, maintains 24-hour telephone communications between both sides. Until April 1994, the Joint Duty Officers normally also met as required. On 28 April 1994, however, the KPA MAC Secretary delivered a message to the UNC that stated that the KPA had decided to recall all remaining KPA MAC members and MAC staff personnel, to cease participation in MAC activities and no longer to recognize the UNCMAC as a counterpart. Further, the KPA announced its intention to withdraw all support for the Polish delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and its intention to send a "new team" appointed by its Supreme Commander to make contact with the "US military" to discuss pending military issues, including a new "durable peace-ensuring system" to replace the MAC;

(c) On 1 September 1994, the Foreign Ministry of China announced in Beijing that it had decided to recall its delegation to the MAC at Panmunjom. This followed the example set earlier in 1994 by the KPA when it withdrew its delegation. On 15 December 1994, the CPV delegation departed Pyongyang for Beijing. This decision by the KPA/CPV to abandon the provisions of the MAC could lead to an increase in minor incidents with the potential to escalate into a more serious situation;

(d) The UNC has continued to attempt to present credentials for personnel newly assigned to the UNCMAC. However, since the KPA's announced withdrawal from the MAC in April 1994, it has refused to accept any credentials from the UNC. During 1996, the KPA refused to accept credentials on three separate occasions;

(e) The MAC is authorized by paragraph 27 of the Armistice Agreement to dispatch joint UNC-KPA/CPV observer teams to investigate reported violations of the Armistice Agreement occurring within the DMZ. The KPA have, however, frustrated this important investigative function by continuously refusing to participate in the investigations proposed by the UNC. They have failed to participate in joint investigations of more than 170 serious incidents in the DMZ since April 1967. However, the UNC continues to dispatch its observer teams into the UNC portion of the DMZ to ensure UNC forces are in compliance with the Armistice Agreement and is prepared to conduct unilateral investigations of alleged armistice violations reported to have occurred in the DMZ. UNC liaison officers from the United Nations Member States still represented in the UNC, namely, Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom - which, in Korea, also represents New Zealand - and the United States participate together with officers from the ROK Advisory Group in these UNC Special Investigative Team (SIT) activities in the DMZ. In 1996, despite numerous reports from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) to the contrary, the DMZ has remained relatively quiet. Notwithstanding, the UNC dispatched its joint observer teams to UNC guard posts within or along the DMZ on 92 occasions

in 1996 to ensure continued compliance with provisions of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the DMZ. In addition, the UNC dispatched eight separate SITs to determine the facts associated with alleged violations of the Armistice;

(f) Formal plenary sessions of the MAC have not been held since the 459th MAC meeting, on 13 February 1991. Nevertheless, the UNC and the KPA have continued to meet in Panmunjom on an informal basis and the telephone link in Panmunjom between the UNC Joint Duty Office and the KPA Panmunjom Mission is still used as an important communications link between the two sides. However, since 3 October 1995, when the KPA representatives at Panmunjom refused to accept a UNC Joint Duty Office message concerning the illegal crossing of the MDL by two civilians without prior coordination, the KPA have refused to accept any messages containing reference to a violation of the Armistice Agreement;

(g) In 1996, there were a total of 44 meetings between the two sides in Panmunjom. Although the KPA has refused to recognize the UNC formally as its dialogue partner, it has continued to engage officers of the UNCMAC secretariat in a series of discussions on the resumption of general officer dialogue in Panmunjom. Both sides recognize the value in the resumption of dialogue at the general officer level in the interest of preventing conflict on the peninsula. The UNC will continue to pursue this dialogue venue for engaging the KPA on Armistice-related issues.

B. UNCMAC Senior Member

4. In accordance with paragraph 20 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, CINCUNC appointed Major-General Cha Ki Mun (subsequently promoted to Lieutenant-General), ROK Army, as the UNCMAC Senior Member (spokesman), effective 31 July 1996. The KPA, however, has repeatedly refused to meet with the Senior Member of the UNC component of the MAC, saying that the South Korean Army was neither a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, nor a Member of the UNC and could not represent the whole armed forces now in South Korea.

(a) This North Korean argument is, however, flawed. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement as Commander of all UNC forces from 16 United Nations Member States and the ROK. Neither individual nations nor their military forces are signatories to the Armistice Agreement. During the Armistice negotiations and subsequent to the signing of the Agreement, the KPA/CPV specifically requested that the ROK furnish assurances that its forces would abide by the terms of the Agreement, saying that the Korean Armistice would not work unless the ROK abided by the Agreement. The UNC relayed such assurances to the KPA/CPV;

(b) Today, the ROK provides "DMZ police" throughout the entire UNC (southern) portion of the DMZ to maintain the Armistice. In addition, ROK senior military officers have regularly served as MAC Members for the past 43 years. The Armistice Agreement addresses MAC membership neither by nationality nor by United Nations affiliation, nor does it give guidelines for designating a Senior Member. Each side has discretionary authority to appoint its Members and such appointments are not subject to approval by the other side. Further, the appointment of a ROK general officer as the UNCMAC Senior Member does not transfer CINCUNC's Armistice maintenance responsibilities to either the

Government of the Republic of Korea or its armed forces. In addition, as the UNC signatory to the Armistice Agreement, CINCUNC is ultimately responsible for ensuring all UNC forces comply with its provisions;

(c) Article 5 of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, effective 19 February 1992, stipulates:

> "The two sides (North and South Korea) shall endeavour together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (27 July 1953) until such a state of peace has been realized."

Thus, the Armistice Agreement between the military commanders remains the only legal regime until it is replaced by a more durable peace between the ROK and DPRK. The Supreme Commander of the KPA has an obligation to respect the terms of the agreement signed in 1953, to recognize the UNC Senior Member, to send representatives to plenary MAC meetings to discuss Armistice-related issues and to help promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The joint UNC-KPA/CPV MAC is an integral part of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

5. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was established in accordance with paragraph 37 of the Armistice Agreement and was originally composed of four senior officers, two appointed by "neutral nations" nominated by the CINCUNC, namely, Sweden and Switzerland, and two appointed by "neutral nations" nominated by the Supreme Commander of the KPA and the Commander of the CPV, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The term "neutral nations" in the Armistice Agreement is defined as nations whose combatant forces did not participate in the Korean conflict. The primary function of the NNSC is to conduct independent inspections and investigations of violations of the Armistice Agreement outside the DMZ and to report its findings to the MAC.

(a) The KPA/CPV reluctantly agreed to an inspection system proposed by the UNC. They have, however, undermined the NNSC function since the signing of the Armistice Agreement by shipping into North Korea reinforcing modern weapons and equipment, completely bypassing the designated ports of entry, in violation of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement;

(b) Since March 1991, the KPA has not only suspended MAC plenary sessions and MAC Senior Member-level communications, but has also suspended its reports to the MAC and NNSC on paragraphs 13 (c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement, which prohibit the introduction into Korea of reinforcing arms and military personnel;

(c) On 10 April 1993, the DPRK forced the Czech delegation to the NNSC to withdraw from the north following the split of Czechoslovakia into two separate States in January 1993. Further the KPA pressured the Polish NNSC delegation to

initiate withdrawal, terminated protocol contacts and harassed the delegation to make their life difficult;

(d) In November 1994, the DPRK officially informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland that Poland's nomination as a Member of the NNSC had been terminated. Despite formal protests from the NNSC in which the Members unanimously declared the measures announced by the KPA a blatant violation of the Armistice Agreement, paragraphs 13 (g), (h) and (j), which would be viewed negatively in the eyes of the international community, the Polish delegation was forced to evacuate their camp at Panmunjom on 28 February 1995. On 3 May 1995, the KPA closed the NNSC buildings controlled by the KPA on Conference Row and announced restrictions on the free movement of the remaining NNSC members and UNCMAC personnel across the MDL into the northern part of the neutral JSA;

(e) Throughout 1996, the NNSC - now represented by only two neutral nations in residence, Sweden and Switzerland - held weekly meetings in the JSA at Panmunjom to review and evaluate reports provided by the UNC regarding the number of arriving and departing military personnel. The Polish Member returned to Panmunjom periodically from Warsaw, meeting with the Swiss and Swedish Members on 30 January, 29 April, 6 and 7 May and 1 and 2 October 1996;

(f) Although DPRK restrictions have severely curtailed the ability of the NNSC to carry out its mission, the NNSC remains an important part of the Armistice Agreement. The KPA seeks to end the NNSC arrangement as well as the MAC and is thus undermining the basic foundation of the Armistice architecture. These North Korean attempts, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement, must be opposed by the international community in order to preserve and maintain the existing Armistice until it is replaced by a more durable peace. The UNC has continued to call upon the KPA to nominate a successor for Czechoslovakia and to restore support to the Polish Member so that the NNSC may continue to function. The KPA has not responded. Although NNSC activities have been curtailed over the years, the presence of "neutral" representatives provides a stabilizing influence on the activities of the opposing sides. The UNC believes, therefore, that the NNSC continues to be an integral part of the Korean Armistice and will keep the Security Council informed of further developments on this issue in future reports.

D. UNC remains issue

6. Paragraph 20 of the Understanding on the Return of Korean War Remains, agreed upon in 1954, stipulates that:

> "In the event that either side discovers in its territory bodies of military personnel belonging to the other side after the termination of this Understanding, the delivery and reception of such bodies shall be arranged through the Secretaries of both sides of the Military Armistice Commission."

Since 1954, the KPA has refused to accept any Armistice-related responsibility for returning remains and has consistently rejected any UNC request for more information concerning those still missing from the war. Since the late 1980s,

the KPA has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with representatives of the US Government in the repatriation of remains from the war.

(a) The KPA began unilaterally recovering and repatriating UNC Korean War remains to the UNC in 1990. Between 20 May 1990 and 13 September 1994, the KPA returned a total of 208 sets of what it claimed were UNC Korean War remains. These remains were sent to the US Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), for positive identification. Owing to the lack of complete documentation on excavation data and co-mingling of remains, the identification process proved extremely difficult. Accordingly, on 7 October 1994, the UNC asked the KPA to suspend further unilateral recovery operations until an agreement could be reached on conducting joint recoveries in North Korea. Although CILHI has determined that all of the remains returned to UNC control are human remains, it has been able to make positive identification of only 7 of 208 sets of the unilaterally recovered remains. One additional set of unilaterally recovered remains, which are believed to be those of a British soldier, was returned on 30 October 1995;

(b) In 1996, the KPA and the US Government reached an agreement on the Korean War remains issue. First, the US Government agreed to compensate the KPA for costs associated with the recovery of remains that were returned between 1990 and 1994. In turn, the KPA agreed to allow a team from CILHI to participate in two joint recovery operations north of the MDL. The first joint recovery operation resulted in the discovery of one US soldier, whose remains were returned under UNC honours in Panmunjom on 29 July 1996 and positively identified by CILHI in September 1996. The UNC remains committed to a full accounting of all those still unaccounted for from the war.

E. Armistice compliance

7. Throughout 1996, the UNC deployed UNCMAC Special Investigative Teams (SIT) into the DMZ to monitor Armistice compliance and to investigate charges of violation of the Armistice Agreement for CINCUNC inside or along the 151-mile southern boundary of the DMZ. Many of these missions were to investigate violations of the Armistice Agreement. The KPA, on the other hand, took additional measures to neutralize the Armistice Agreement further as an effective mechanism for preventing conflict on the Peninsula and refused to acknowledge its responsibility to abide by all its provisions.

(a) On 15 February 1996, the KPA violated the Armistice Agreement when six KPA soldiers entered the JSA, approximately 200 metres north of the MDL, carrying automatic weapons and anti-tank rocket-grenade launchers. The soldiers remained in the JSA for approximately 15 minutes. When the UNC attempted to make contact with the KPA and protest at this activity, the KPA refused to accept the message;

(b) On 4 April 1996, the KPA announced that it would no longer accept responsibility for the maintenance and administration of the DMZ and the MDL. Following the announcement, the KPA guard force in the JSA removed the distinctive insignia specified in the Armistice Agreement and the Subsequent Agreement on the MAC Headquarters Area. Based on subsequent observation, KPA

personnel and vehicles have continued to operate throughout the northern sector of the DMZ without displaying the appropriate distinctive insignia;

(c) In the evening hours on 5, 6 and 7 April 1996, the KPA guard force in the JSA was reinforced with a large number of additional soldiers. An UNCMAC SIT determined that in each case there were over 200 additional soldiers armed with assault rifles, heavy and medium machine-guns, rocket-grenade launchers and recoilless rifles introduced into the JSA. The additional soldiers remained in the area for several hours each evening and prepared defensive positions in the northern sector of the JSA. The KPA refused to accept any telephonic messages or meetings with the representatives from the UNCMAC to discuss or protest these actions;

(d) On 11 April 1996, the KPA again violated the Armistice Agreement when seven armed KPA soldiers crossed the MDL in the vicinity of MDL marker 0735. The soldiers proceeded approximately 300 metres south of the MDL and remained in the area for 45 minutes. At 2130 on 11 April 1996, 10 KPA soldiers were again detected south of the MDL in the same general vicinity. Splitting into two separate groups, the soldiers occupied separate hills 200 and 300 metres south of the MDL until 0230. Both groups left the area without incident. The KPA refused to accept a UNC telephone message protesting against these violations;

(e) On 17 May 1996, seven armed KPA soldiers crossed the MDL in the vicinity of marker 0473 and proceeded approximately 60 to 80 metres into the southern portion of the DMZ. Despite three separate warnings broadcast over loudspeakers that they had crossed the MDL, the KPA soldiers failed to return. When the UNC civil police fired warning shots in a direction away from the KPA soldiers, the KPA soldiers returned to the northern portion of the DMZ;

(f) On 18 September 1996, a KPA submarine was found stranded on the shore in the vicinity of Kangnung, Republic of Korea. Although the KPA claimed that the submarine had drifted south of the MDL after developing engine trouble, an UNCMAC SIT determined that the submarine with a crew of 26 personnel had violated paragraphs 12 and 15 of the Armistice Agreement by purposely infiltrating south of the MDL. After running aground, the crew further violated paragraph 14 of the Armistice Agreement by coming ashore in the area under the control of the UNC. The UNC made three separate attempts to protest at this infiltration to the KPA in Panmunjom. However, the KPA refused to accept the protests. After an extensive search conducted primarily by members of the ROK armed forces, 24 infiltrators were killed, one was captured and one remains unaccounted for. The remains of the 24 crew members killed in the incident were repatriated through Panmunjom by the UNCMAC on 30 December 1996;

(g) On 13 October 1996, KPA soldiers from a guard post located in the vicinity of MDL marker 1283 fired a recoilless rifle located in the DMZ north of the MDL across the MDL. The round from the recoilless rifle impacted and exploded near a UNC guard post. In the evening of the same day, a KPA soldier defected to the South through the DMZ in the same area. An UNCMAC SIT determined that although the shooting incident did represent a violation of the Armistice Agreement, it was most likely in response to the actions taken by the defector. There was no damage to property or injuries to personnel as a result of the incident.

F. Repatriation ceremonies in Panmunjom

8. There were several repatriation ceremonies conducted in Panmunjom throughout the year. The repatriation of military personnel was accomplished by the UNCMAC secretariat and the UNC honour guard. The repatriation of civilians was accomplished by the South Korean and North Korean Red Cross and facilitated by the UNCMAC secretariat.

(a) On 5 March 1996, the South Korean Red Cross repatriated two civilians and the remains of two others to the North. The four individuals were part of the crew of a North Korean merchant ship that had sunk in the Sea of Japan (East Sea);

(b) On 29 May 1996, the UNC repatriated the remains of one KPA soldier. The soldier was discovered on the south bank of the Hantan River and was believed to be a flood victim;

(c) On 29 July 1996, the UNC repatriated one KPA soldier. The soldier had been swept south of the MDL by flood waters in the Imjin River. After receiving medical care in the South, the soldier requested to be repatriated to the North. Immediately after the repatriation of this soldier, the KPA also repatriated the remains of one Korean War era serviceman recovered by the first US-DPRK joint remains recovery operation;

(d) On 7 August 1996, the UNC repatriated the remains of two KPA soldiers. Both soldiers were drowning victims and were discovered on the southern bank of the Soyang and Imjin River. The South Korean Red Cross also returned the remains of two civilian flood victims;

(e) On 12 August 1996, the North Korean Red Cross repatriated the remains of one South Korean civilian who was believed to be a drowning victim;

(f) On 26 November 1996, the UNC repatriated one KPA soldier who drifted into ROK territorial waters when the boat he was in broke loose from its mooring. Upon being rescued, the soldier requested to be repatriated to the North;

(g) On 30 December 1996, the UNC repatriated the remains of the 24 crew members from the submarine that had infiltrated ROK territorial waters on 18 September 1996. The UNC conducted the repatriation ceremony in response to a request by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

III. SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS

9. While the UNC is not directly involved in the South-North dialogue or negotiations, it has provided administrative assistance and security for these talks and other contacts held in the JSA, Panmunjom. The simultaneous entry of the ROK and DPRK into the United Nations in September 1991 affected neither the status nor the role of the UNC. The UNC continues to perform an important peace-enforcement role in Korea, in particular in maintaining the Armistice until an effective and enduring peace is attained through political dialogue.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

10. The maintenance of timely and effective communications between the commanders of the opposing military forces is vital to preclude possible incidents and to defuse the situation in the event incidents occur, thereby preventing the resumption of hostilities. All parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement - the UNC, KPA and CPV - have played a role in this vital activity for more than 43 years. To continue this vital mission until a more durable peace is attained, both sides must fully cooperate to preserve the existing means of communication through the Armistice mechanism - the MAC, which is an integral part of the Armistice. The UNC will continue its efforts to implement the Armistice Agreement and thereby contribute to a stable environment conducive to South-North dialogue and the ultimate goal of a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.